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 When the Hot Stove Goes Cold: The 
TCJA, Baseball Contracts, and 
Avoiding an Administrative 
Nightmare 
 Zachary T. Robinson* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, a sweeping tax reform bill 
which altered huge swaths of the Internal Revenue Code. Among the numerous 
changes was an alteration to § 1031 of the Code, which defers taxable gains for 
taxpayers exchanging property with other taxpayers for similar property; more 
specifically, the Act limited this section to real property. 
 
Sports teams would often trade player contracts with one another, and those trades 
were considered like-kind exchanges of personal property. As a result of this new 
law, these organizations have to grapple with the chance that they will face addi-
tional tax liability. Since the recognition of gain requires the identification of an 
asset’s fair market value, these teams may be required to develop a workable sys-
tem for valuing player contracts across their leagues. 
 
This task may prove impossible thanks to the difficulty of assigning value to play-
er contracts and may lead to deleterious effects to teams both on and off the field. 
As a result, the most plausible and reasonable solution would be for Congress to 
amend the Code to exempt professional sports leagues from compulsory compli-
ance. 
  
                                                          
* Zachary T. Robinson received his B.S. in Journalism from Missouri State University in Springfield, 
Missouri. Zach is currently a J.D. candidate at the University of Missouri School of Law with an antic-
ipated graduation date of May 2020. The author would like to thank Kenyon Briggs and Emily Crane 
for their guidance, as well as Randy Diamond for his unbelievable research expertise. Special thanks to 
Michelle Arnopol Cecil for her unending enthusiasm and wisdom, unparalleled guidance in the subject 
matter, and curiously cheerful willingness to edit the author’s article by hand. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the 2017 trade deadline, the Houston Astros were in a tough 
spot. Having lost 17 of their previous 27 games, the division-leading Astros 
seemed to stall in their hunt for postseason play, and General Manager Jeff 
Luhnow wanted to act.1 In the waning seconds of the day, the Astros sent three 
prospects to the Detroit Tigers in exchange for 34-year-old former All-Star and Cy 
Young Award winner Justin Verlander in return.2 While Verlander was a stable, 
reliable arm, he finished the season with the Astros in a way nobody expected – 
pitching in five games over the rest of the season, throwing for 34 innings, giving 
up four earned runs, hurling 43 strikeouts, and walking five for an eye-popping 
earned run average (“ERA”)3 of 1.06.4 Verlander continued his dominance in the 
postseason, winning four games in five starts with 38 strikeouts and notching a 
2.21 ERA.5 In the end, the Astros hoisted the franchise’s first World Series trophy 
in its 55-year existence.6 Verlander was named the American League Champion-
ship Series’ Most Valuable Player (“MVP”) as well as co-Babe Ruth Award win-
ner.7 
It is not often that a late-season addition like Verlander makes such an imme-
diate and substantial impact on a team’s chances of winning, yet it is hard to imag-
ine the Astros realizing the same success if the front office had not made the deci-
sion to trade for him. Looking at the trade in retrospect, this was an easy decision. 
But what if it had not been so easy? What if the Astros were forced to incur sub-
stantial tax liability in order to bring Verlander to Houston? Would the owners 
have found the transaction to be worth it at the time, and would they have even 
been able to accept the resulting decrease in their finances? 
From the 2017 Major League Baseball (“MLB”) offseason through the trade 
deadline in September 2018, MLB teams participated in more than 130 trades.8 
While some of the trades involved relative no-names, has-beens, and minor 
leaguers, some franchises in baseball said goodbye to their beloved heroes, all in 
the name of the future.9 Baseball trades are now less of a sideshow and more of a 
central focus of America’s pastime, arguably as important as the actual games 
unfolding on the diamond. However, a recent change in the tax law might funda-
                                                          
 1. Ben Reiter, The Astros’ Justin Verlander Trade Violated Their Philosophy… And May Win 
Them the Pennant, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/mlb/2017/09/22/houston-astros-justin-verlander-trade-0. 
 2. Brian McTaggert, Last-minute Verlander deal lifts up Houston, MLB.COM (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/astros-trade-for-pitcher-justin-verlander/c-251757752. 
 3. STATMUSE, https://www.statmuse.com/musings/justin-verlander-has-43-strikeouts-this-month-
the-most-by-a-houston-astr-60a3e8db (last updated Sept. 27, 2017). 
 4. Verlander, Altuve, Astros wrap up sweep, rout Rangers 12-2, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/gametracker/recap/MLB_20170927_HOU@TEX/. 
 5. Justin Verlander Stats, ESPN.COM, 
http://www.espn.com/mlb/player/stats/_/id/6341/justin-verlander (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 6. Richard Justice, Astros gave their city 2017’s greatest gift, MLB.COM (Dec. 31, 2017), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/astros-world-series-win-helped-houston-heal/c-264115530. 
 7. Simon Sharkey-Gotlieb, Altuve, Verlander share Babe Ruth Award as postseason co-MVPs, THE 
SCORE, https://www.thescore.com/mlb/news/1417589 (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 8. 2018 MLB Transactions, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-
reference.com/leagues/MLB/2018-transactions.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 
 9. Id. 
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mentally change whether baseball trading continues in the future—a change that 
will similarly affect transactions in other sports as well.10 
On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”).11 Amid its wide array of statutory changes to the 
Internal Revenue Code,12 one particular change could have a profound effect on 
sports franchises: the repeal of the like-kind exchange provisions for exchanges of 
personal property.13 Because sports trades are deemed like-kind exchanges of 
intangible personal property, a literal application of this law will require profes-
sional sports teams to calculate gains received in exchanges of player contracts 
between teams and pay tax on those gains.14 Putting aside the questions concern-
ing how to assign a fair market value to a player contract, this law could also have 
a potentially deleterious effect on player trades (like those that gave the Astros a 
World Series championship and MVP pitcher), as well as adverse effects on own-
ers, players, and even spectators. This article will delve deeply into how this law 
will work in practice by examining the issues that will likely arise. It will also 
assess some of the law’s unforeseen consequences and propose a solution that will 
allow professional sports trades to go on unfettered. 
Part II of this article will first establish a statutory framework of relevant tax 
concepts, including depreciation, capital gains, realization events, and like-kind 
exchanges, as well as how those provisions have molded transactions between 
professional baseball teams in the past. Part III of this article will introduce the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, specifically the portion that alters like-kind ex-
changes, as well as the policy justifications for its enactment. Part IV will provide 
a thorough explanation of the implications of the TCJA, along with speculation of 
its consequences, with particular emphasis on the problems concerning objective 
player valuation and a closer look at an already-proposed solution. Finally, Part V 
of this article will explore a number of solutions to the problem, spanning from 
the feasibility of requesting a Congressional exemption to a uniform valuation 
system that would be palatable and acceptable to baseball teams so as to preserve 
the ability of teams to participate fully in inter-league transactions. 
II. PRE-TCJA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
BASEBALL PLAYER CONTRACTS 
Before exploring the effects of the tax law on the sports player contract sys-
tem, it is useful to provide background information concerning relevant tax con-
cepts. 
                                                          
 10. Beate Erwin, A Fundamental Change of The Professional Sports Landscape Under The 2017 
U.S. Tax Reform? The End of Like-Kind Exchanges for U.S. Sports Trades, MONDAQ (July 16, 2018), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/716850/Sport/A+fundamental+change+of+the+professional+s
ports. 
 11. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054. 
 12. See generally Preliminary Details and Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Tax Found., 
Special Report No. 241, 2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171220113959/TaxFoundation-
SR241-TCJA-3.pdf. 
 13. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054, § 13303(a). 
 14. Jim Tankersley, A Curveball from the New Tax Law: It Makes Baseball Trades Harder, THE 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/politics/baseball-tax-law-.html. 
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A. Basis 
An asset’s basis is the amount of a taxpayer’s capital investment in that as-
set.15 In most instances, a taxpayer’s basis is its cost to that taxpayer.16 This 
amount includes the purchase price of the asset plus other expenses incurred in its 
acquisition, such as debt incurred to buy the asset, property given in exchange for 
the asset, or services.17 There are also a number of instances when a taxpayer’s 
adjusted basis is not its cost.18 For example, in the event that a taxpayer acquires 
an asset by exchanging it for another asset, the taxpayer’s basis in the item that he 
receives is equal to the fair market value of the property received.19 If a taxpayer 
acquires an asset in exchange for performing services, the fair market value of the 
property received is deemed to be the taxpayer’s basis.20 There are a number of 
other ways to determine basis, all contingent on the circumstances under which 
the property was acquired by the taxpayer.21 
In any case, once a taxpayer arrives at the initial basis (cost, transferred, ex-
changed or otherwise), it must then be adjusted upward or downward as a result of 
subsequent events.22 For example, basis is increased if a taxpayer makes capital 
expenditures with respect to the asset.23 Other events, like § 179 depreciation, may 
cause the basis in the asset to go down.24 Upon making these alterations, the tax-
payer is left with his or her “adjusted basis,” which is then used to calculate total 
gain or loss realized by the taxpayer upon disposition of that asset in the future.25 
For example, assume that on January 1, 2019, Farmer A purchases a barn for 
$50,000. In addition to the sale price of the barn, he also pays $2,000 in commis-
sion to the broker who facilitated the sale, as well as title and legal fees of $1,000. 
Farmer A pays $5,000 to run utility lines to the barn and spends an additional 
$12,000 to repair and improve the barn. At this point, Farmer A’s adjusted basis in 
the barn is $70,000; since the aforementioned actions adjust his basis upward, they 
are added to the $50,000 cost basis in the barn to arrive at the adjusted basis. After 
one year, on January 1, 2020, Farmer A decides to depreciate a portion of the barn 
over the next year by an amount of $7,000 (more on depreciation in Subpart II-B). 
On January 1, 2021, Farmer A’s adjusted basis in the barn is now at $63,000: his 
adjusted basis up to January 1, 2020, less the amount depreciated for 2020. 
As was briefly mentioned, basis does not always tell the whole story. The In-
ternal Revenue Code provides taxpayers with the ability to defer tax liability for 
certain asset transactions, so long as they account for that benefit in a way that 
attaches to the asset itself, preserving any inherent characteristics which would 
yield tax revenue. One such example is depreciation. 
                                                          
 15. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 551, BASIS OF ASSETS 2 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p551.pdf [hereinafter BASIS OF ASSETS]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 7. 
 19. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 188 (1954). 
 20. BASIS OF ASSETS, supra note 15, at 7. 
 21. Id. at 7–11. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id. at 5. 
 24. Id. at 6. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
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B. Depreciation 
Depreciation is a mechanism by which a taxpayer may recover the costs of a 
particular piece of property over the economically-useful life of that property.26 
The purpose of depreciation is to “offset the taxpayer’s original investment 
against the gross income received in subsequent years, and to thereby limit the 
taxpayer’s net taxable income to the excess of revenues over related expenses.”27 
When a taxpayer depreciates an asset, they are lowering their basis in that asset by 
the depreciation amount.28 The amount depreciated may not exceed their basis; 
that is to say, once a taxpayer has depreciated an amount equal to their basis, they 
have reached their limit and may not depreciate any more.29 While used mainly 
for tangible property, the depreciation allowance also extends to intangible assets, 
a category to which player contracts belong, albeit under a technically different 
mechanism known as “amortization.”30 
For a property to be deemed depreciable, four requirements must be met: (1) 
“[t]he taxpayer must own the property,” (2) the taxpayer must use the property in 
his or her trade or business or in an income-producing activity, (3) “[t]he property 
must have a determinable useful life of more than one year,” and (4) the property 
must be subject to wear and tear or obsolescence.31 
Property may be depreciated only “if its useful life is ‘definite and predicta-
ble.’”32 Useful life is essentially how long the property “is likely to be in service 
in the taxpayer’s business” or profit-making activity.33 Estimating the useful life 
of a property is of utmost importance in determining the property’s depreciation 
strategy.34 Assuming that straight-line depreciation is used,35 the taxpayer’s final 
depreciated amount will dovetail with the end of its useful life.36 However, by 
estimating the useful life of property in a way that does not truly reflect its ex-
pected useful life, a taxpayer may either help or hinder herself financially.37 For 
instance, if a taxpayer were to overestimate the useful life of a property, deprecia-
tion will still be taking place after the actual useful life of the property for the 
taxpayer to take full advantage of the deduction allowance, representing a missed 
opportunity for the taxpayer.38 
                                                          
 26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 946, HOW TO 
DEPRECIATE PROPERTY 3 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf [hereinafter HOW TO 
DEPRECIATE PROPERTY]. 
 27. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation 183 (14th ed. 2018). 
 28. Id. at 182. 
 29. Id. at 183. 
 30. Id. 
 31. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DEPRECIATION, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/a-brief-overview-of-depreciation (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2019). 
 32. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 27. 
 33. Id. at 184. 
 34. Id. 
 35. The straight-line method, which allows a taxpayer to “deduct the same amount of depreciation 
each year over the useful life of the property,” is calculated by subtracting any salvage value of an 
asset from its adjusted basis (resulting in the total depreciation amount available for a particular asset) 
and dividing that number by the years of useful life of the asset. HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY, 
supra note 26, at 9. 
 36. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 27, at 184. 
 37. Id. at 184–85. 
 38. Id. 
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On the other hand, if a taxpayer underestimates the useful life of the property, 
the straight-line deduction leads to greater amounts deducted earlier on.39 This 
allows the taxpayer to postpone the tax liability. For example, if an asset’s true 
useful life is ten years and the taxpayer estimates the useful life as five, he will 
depreciate the full amount in five years. In this case, he will have taken full ad-
vantage of the immediate benefits afforded by depreciation yet will still only face 
tax liability if and when the asset is disposed of.40 
This latter method represents a substantial opportunity to the taxpayer.41 If the 
taxpayer owns property during a period of inflation, the depreciation benefit might 
otherwise be wiped out by rising inflation levels.42 The net effect of this is that the 
taxpayer realizes a benefit more quickly and the economic effects are essentially 
the same for the taxpayer.43 However, because of the time value of money,44 this 
would seemingly represent an economic loss to the government. 
Indeed, in 1981, the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Code”) was amended 
in such a way that allowed taxpayers to depreciate their assets over shorter periods 
of time – much shorter than their actual useful life.45 By enacting the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System (“ACRS”),46 Congress acted with the stated intent to stim-
ulate investment in depreciable assets by business owners.47 In doing so, it became 
less important to tie such depreciation to its true useful life; rather, the focus shift-
ed to doing what was necessary to permit and encourage business and investment 
transactions.48 
While there are still concerns about how ACRS and similar depreciation 
mechanisms affect the measurement of a taxpayer’s true taxable income, deter-
mining whether a depreciation schedule is proper has largely been shaped by no-
tions of how manipulating this schedule incentivizes or inhibits investment in 
depreciable assets.49 Still, it must be noted that the ACRS is beneficial to taxpay-
ers not by eliminating a tax burden, but by allowing a deferral of the tax.50 The 
two primary benefits of the ACRS are that (1) it allows property to be depreciated 
over its recovery period, which is nearly always shorter than its actual useful life, 
and (2) it allows personal property to be depreciated using an accelerated method, 
which provides for more depreciation in the early years and thereby allows a tax-
payer to recover his or her investment costs more quickly.51 
                                                          
 39. Id. at 184. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 184–85. 
 42. Id. at 183. 
 43. Id. at 184. 
 44. Time Value of Money, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/timevalueofmoney.asp (“The time value of money… is the 
concept that money available at the present time is worth more than the identical sum in the future due 
to its potential earning capacity.”) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019). 
 45. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 27, at 184. 
 46. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 534, DEPRECIATING 
PROPERTY PLACED IN SERVICE BEFORE 1987 2 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p534.pdf 
[hereinafter DEPRECIATING PROPERTY]. 
 47. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 27, at 185. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 185–86. 
 50. Id. at 192. 
 51. Id. at 194. 
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The initial idea for the ACRS was to increase cash flow for investments and 
allow more property depreciation.52 Indeed, the system’s supporters said this goal 
was achieved, attributing the country’s recent rebound from an economic reces-
sion in part to the ACRS.53 However, it was not without criticism. Some argued 
that the ACRS, by allowing businesses to depreciate assets very quickly (thereby 
lowering corporate taxes owed), helped corporations dress up their earnings by 
creating wider gaps between cash flow and reported earnings.54 Others argued that 
the ACRS created a favorable environment for hostile corporate takeovers.55 
In light of these concerns, Congress replaced the ACRS with the Modified 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (“MACRS”).56 This newer system is distinct 
from ACRS in that its recovery periods are longer, which reduces the annual de-
preciation amounts taken.57 MACRS is made up of two separate depreciation 
methods: the General Depreciation System and the Alternative Depreciation Sys-
tem.58 While the General Depreciation System is used for most kinds of property, 
the Alternative Depreciation System applies only to property “which is used for 
business purposes 50 percent of the time or less, is used predominantly outside the 
United States, or is used for tax-exempt purposes”59 
In 2004, the IRS published temporary and proposed changes to MACRS.60 
One of the relevant alterations involves like-kind exchanges, in that property ac-
quired through such an exchange is handled differently, if both the property re-
ceived and the property given are subject to MACRS.61 Additionally, the property 
“must also have changed hands prior to February 27, 2004.”62 
There are certain types of property which cannot be depreciated.63 Land, for 
example, cannot be depreciated, as it does not wear out, achieve obsolescence, or 
become “used up” as the phrase is generally understood to mean.64 Another class 
of assets which cannot be depreciated is § 197 intangibles, which must be “amor-
tized.”65 In general, if intangible property is the type which can be amortized, the 
preferred method is the straight-line method.66 If an asset is not used for a full year 
in the first year of its use, the depreciation deduction must be prorated in accord-
ance with the number of months it was actually in use.67 
The taxpayer may begin depreciating property when it is placed into “service 
for use in [a] trade or business or for the production of income.”68 A property is no 
                                                          
 52. Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), INC. (2019), 
https://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/accelerated-cost-recovery-system-acrs.html (last visited Oct. 17, 
2019). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY, supra note 26, at 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 9; Taxpayers may also have the opportunity to depreciate certain intangibles in accordance 
with the “income forecast method.” See id. at 10. 
 67. Id. at 9. 
 68. Id. at 7. 
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longer eligible for depreciation when the taxpayer has deducted an amount equal 
to their basis in that property, or if the taxpayer retires that property from ser-
vice—whichever happens first.69 
For example, assume Farmer A purchases a seed patent for $50,000. Assum-
ing that (a) the patent is eligible for depreciation deductions and is not a § 197 
intangible, (b) the patent has a useful life of ten years, and (c) the farmer chooses 
to deduct the patent via straight-line method, Farmer A may deduct $5,000 in 
depreciation from the basis of the patent each year for ten years. At that point, 
Farmer A will have an adjusted basis in the patent of $0. 
After a taxpayer’s adjusted basis in an asset has been changed, he may dis-
pose of these assets in some way, either through sale, exchange, retirement, or the 
like.70 In some of these cases, the taxpayer may find that the asset is fetching a 
price to another person which differs from the adjusted basis they themselves have 
in that property. In that case, the taxpayer will likely face tax consequences for a 
transaction that reflects the disparity of values in the form of realizing, and possi-
bly recognizing, gain or loss.71 
C. Gain or Loss 
Upon the disposition of an asset, the price fetched for property is not always 
exactly the same as the original owner’s basis in that property. In fact, in many 
cases, it is preferable to the taxpayer for another person to value the asset more 
than he does. If a taxpayer agrees to a transaction in which he is departing with 
property and receiving an amount of cash or property which has a higher value 
than his basis in the property he gives up, and that property is a capital asset,72 he 
has experienced a gain.73 The opposite is also true: if he receives an amount or 
item valued lower than the basis in the property he is giving up, he has experi-
enced a loss.74 
Realization is the event by which an asset, either through being sold or dis-
possessed by its owner in some way, results in the owner having to account for 
such a change in that item’s value.75 This event occurs at the point of sale or loss 
of an asset, when the taxpayer receives or loses something of monetary value.76 
Even if a taxpayer realizes a gain, however, they need not face tax consequences 
immediately. Realized gains have an immediate impact on the taxpayer, by being 
included in gross income, only if they are subject to “recognition.”77 
Conceptually, recognition typically goes hand-in-hand with realization.78 In 
fact, the IRS provides that if a gain or loss is realized, it is recognized by default 
                                                          
 69. Id. 
 70. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 544, SALES AND OTHER 
DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS 2 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p544.pdf [hereinafter SALES AND 
OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. I.R.C. § 1221 (2019); see SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS, supra note 70, at 20. 
 73. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2019); see SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS, supra note 70, at 3. 
 74. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2019); see SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS, supra note 70, at 3. 
 75. SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS, supra note 70, at 3. 
 76. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940). 
 77. SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS, supra note 70, at 4. 
 78. The implication of § 1001(c) is that realization is typically accompanied by recognition, with a 
few noted exceptions. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2019). 
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unless otherwise provided by the Code.79 Scattered throughout the Code are these 
conditions wherein a gain or loss may be eligible to go unrecognized—aptly re-
ferred to as “nonrecognition provisions.”80 It is common for a nonrecognition 
provision to apply if the IRS views a transaction as a taxpayer merely shifting his 
investment from one property to another. In such a case, the idea is that the tax-
payer is “continuing his investment,” and therefore should not have a taxable con-
sequence.81 Keep in mind, however, that such an unrecognized gain or loss does 
not disappear; rather, it is preserved and “deferred” to a point in the future, osten-
sibly at a point where the taxpayer truly “ends” their investment in the property by 
sale or exchange.82 
For example, assume that Farmer A purchases a tractor for $50,000 and later 
sells it for $100,000. Assuming no depreciation, Farmer A’s basis in the tractor is 
$50,000, the amount realized is $100,000, and the realized gain is $50,000. As-
suming a nonrecognition provision does not apply to this transaction, Farmer A 
must recognize this gain by including the $50,000 in his gross income for the 
taxable year in which the transaction occurred. 
Some examples of nonrecognition provisions include transfers between 
spouses and certain former spouses,83 involuntary conversions,84 and like-kind 
exchanges.85 The last of these is the most relevant to our inquiry and is explored in 
depth in the following section. 
D. Like-Kind Exchanges 
Section 1031 of the Code provides a unique opportunity for taxpayers who 
wish to exchange an asset with another to do so with beneficial tax consequences. 
A like-kind exchange, also known as a § 1031 exchange, occurs when parties 
exchange assets that are so similar, the gain inherent in those assets is deferred, 
and does not generate an immediate tax liability.86 
There are four requirements for a like-kind exchange. First, both properties to 
be transferred must be held for use in the taxpayer’s trade or business, or held for 
investment.87 Second, as the name suggests, both properties must be of a similar 
kind.88 The properties must be of similar nature or character, without regard to 
                                                          
 79. Id. (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss, deter-
mined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property, shall be recognized.”). 
 80. Michael J. Graetz & Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 625 
(Foundation Press, 5th ed. 2005). 
 81. Erik M. Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Special Treatment of Like Kind Exchanges, 4 Am. 
J. Tax Pol’y 193, 203 (1985) (discussing the relatively “noncontroversial” justification for like-kind 
exchanges receiving nonrecognition treatment). 
 82. James D. Bryce, Deferred Exchanges: Nonrecognition Transactions After Starker, 56 TUL. L. 
REV. 42 (1981) (“Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no gain or loss will be 
recognized in an exchange of like-kind property. In other words, the gain that is realized when appreci-
ated property is exchanged for other property is not taken into account for federal income tax purposes 
at the time of the exchange, but is deferred until the property received is sold or exchanged.”). 
 83. I.R.C. § 1041 (2019). 
 84. I.R.C. § 1033. 
 85. I.R.C. § 1031. 
 86. What Is a 1031 Exchange? The Basics for Real Estate Investors, CWS CAPITAL PARTNERS, 
https://www.cwscapital.com/what-is-a-1031-exchange/ (last visited on Oct. 19, 2019). 
 87. I.R.C. § 1031. 
 88. Id. 
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“grade or quality.”89 Further, the determination of whether property is like-kind to 
another will also depend on the “class” or “kind” of the properties being ex-
changed.90 If one party receives additional consideration in the transaction other 
than like-kind property, such as cash or non-like-kind property, the gain to the 
recipient of the exchange must be recognized to the extent of the fair market value 
of that extra property received.91 Such gain realized in a like-kind exchange is 
considered ordinary income to the extent that the gain is subject to depreciation 
recapture.92 Third, there must be an exchange.93 Fourth, the taxpayer must only 
receive like-kind property in the transaction.94 
As mentioned previously, in a like-kind exchange, any realized gain is not 
eliminated; rather, it is deferred to when the asset is later transferred.95 Since basis 
in the asset is required to make that calculation, the taxpayer must properly record 
the basis of the property received so that the realized gain is recognized when that 
property is later sold. 
In a like-kind exchange, the basis of the property a taxpayer receives is equal 
to the basis in the property they give up.96 The taxpayer receives a holding period 
equal to the holding period they had in the asset they transferred, but only in the 
like-kind asset itself; additional property received in the exchange aside from the 
like-kind asset receives a new holding period.97 A like-kind exchange need not 
occur all at once. The property may be received within 180 days after conveyance 
of the departing property.98 Further, the taxpayer must identify the property they 
are receiving in the exchange within 45 days of relinquishing the outgoing proper-
ty.99 Thus, the basis of an asset acquired in a like-kind exchange is an exchanged 
basis, equal to the basis of the property given in the exchange.100 This preserves 
the gain in the property transferred by locking its basis into the acquired property. 
When the received property is later sold, the seller recognizes both any gain that 
accrued since he began possessing the property, as well as any gain that had oc-
curred in the hands of its previous owner (which had been deferred via § 1031).101 
For example, assume Farmer A possesses a tractor with a basis of $50,000 
and a fair market value of $100,000. He wishes to exchange his tractor with 
Farmer B for a similar tractor with a fair market value of $110,000 as well as 
$10,000 in cash. Farmer A will recognize a gain of $10,000, includable in income, 
attributable to the cash. He will have realized an additional $60,000 gain attributa-
                                                          
 89. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (2019) (“Definition of “like kind.” As used in section 1031(a) [26 
USCS § 1031(a)], the words like kind have reference to the nature or character of the property and not 
to its grade or quality.”). 
 90. Id. (“One kind or class of property may not, under that section, be exchanged for property of a 
different kind or class.”). 
 91. I.R.C. § 1031(b); such additional consideration is commonly referred to as “boot.” See Boot, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/boot.asp (last updated Feb. 22, 2018). 
 92. See I.R.C. § 1245. For additional information about depreciation recapture, see Depreciation 
Recapture, INVESTOPEDIA https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/depreciationrecapture.asp (last 
updated Aug. 28, 2019). 
 93. I.R.C. § 1031. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bryce, supra note 82, at 42. 
 96. BASIS OF ASSETS, supra note 15, at 8. 
 97. I.R.C. § 1223. 
 98. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B)(i). 
 99. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A). 
 100. BASIS OF ASSETS, supra note 15, at 10. 
 101. SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF ASSETS, supra note 70, at 12. 
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ble to the difference between his basis ($50,000) and the fair market value of 
Farmer B’s tractor ($110,000), but—assuming the tractors are considered to be of 
similar nature or character—§ 1031 applies to the transaction, allowing Farmer A 
to defer this $60,000 gain until he disposes of the tractor in a later taxable sale or 
exchange. 
E. Status Quo of Player Contract Tax Treatment Pre-TCJA 
In order to understand the potential consequences to MLB teams engaged in 
the player trade market, it may prove useful to first establish the tax consequences 
as the teams themselves grew accustomed to them, as they have stayed until the 
passage of the TCJA. 
A sports team has a tax basis in a player’s contract which equals what they 
paid to acquire that player, which could include any amount owed to that player in 
the future.102 This amount includes any bonuses paid to the player for signing their 
contract.103 In accordance with the principles of exchanged basis, upon an ex-
change of players, a team would ostensibly take an adjusted basis in the player 
contract they receive equal to the fair market value of the contract of the player 
they gave up. However, for reasons that are discussed below,104 the calculation of 
fair market value for a player contract is a nebulous concept which, in conjunction 
with the like-kind exchange treatment afforded by player contract trades, often 
rendered the calculation unnecessary. 
It seems intuitive that a baseball contract would be a depreciable asset; as 
time goes on, players get older and lose some of their athletic skill, contributing 
less to the value of their team.105 However, this intuition does not always win the 
day. Thus, a historical analysis of the tax treatment of player contracts is neces-
sary. 
The dispute concerning player contracts began in the early 20th century, after 
the Chicago Cubs and Pittsburgh Pirates broke accounting tradition.106 While most 
teams up until this point had deducted the difference between contracts bought 
and sold each year, these two teams began deducting the full amount of a given 
player’s contract in a given year.107 Each team’s rationale for this practice was that 
because the contracts themselves were usually only for one year at a time, teams 
should deduct them in that year, as opposed to depreciating their value over time, 
because the useful life of the contract was at most a year.108 The Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS” or “Service”), however, took issue with the teams’ interpretation 
                                                          
 102. Erwin, supra note 10. 
 103. Rev. Rul. 67–379, 1967–2 C.B. 127. 
 104. See infra Part IV. 
 105. Harvey Bezozi, Tax Reform’s Impact on Professional Sports, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Apr. 
30, 2018), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/high-net-worth/tax-reform-s-impact-professional-
sports. 
 106. Chicago Nat’l League Ball Club v. Comm’r; 33,197 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 239 (1933), aff’d 74 F.2d 
1010 (1935); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1074 (1933), aff’d 72 F.2d 883 (1934). 
 107. Jeff Peterson, The Tax Implications of Owning a Professional Sports Franchise (Apr. 23, 2018) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Connecticut) (on file with the University of Connecticut Li-
brary). 
 108. Id. 
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of the contract terms, specifically regarding their relationship to a common provi-
sion in those contracts: the “reserve clause.”109 
Prior to 1975 and the advent of free agency, baseball contracts took the form 
of one-year contracts that included what was known as a reserve clause.110 Once a 
player signed a contract, the team was entitled to one year of performance from 
that player at the agreed-upon rate.111 Upon the expiration of that contract, howev-
er, the reserve clause took effect. This allowed the team to exercise an exclusive 
option to renew the player’s contract for another year, subject to negotiation of 
terms with that player.112 The player was not free to enter into a contract with 
another team while the reserve clause was in effect.113 If he were to continue play-
ing professional baseball, his former team effectively had the right of first refusal. 
Unless the team agreed to unconditionally release that player to be signed by other 
teams, his professional career was tied to that team.114 While he certainly had the 
right to hold out and refuse to sign a contract with that team, exercising that right 
would effectively put an end to his career. 
In Pittsburgh, the Service attempted to disallow the team’s preferred deduc-
tion schedule, ostensibly under the logic set out in earlier cases that,115 because the 
reserve clause gave each team a perpetual option, a one-year contract rarely re-
sulted in a player having a single-year tenure with a team.116 In fact, it was com-
mon that players would remain with a single club for their entire career, which 
could often span a decade, because of the reserve clause.117 To remedy this prob-
lem, the Service suggested that player contract amounts should be deducted over 
the course of at least three years, a period of time that represented the average 
length of a player’s career at the time.118 
In both cases, the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of the teams.119 
The rationale was that even though the teams had these perpetual options, the 
player could technically retire at any time; therefore, the team did not have com-
plete control over them (at least to the extent relevant to the court).120 Further, the 
Board said that these options did not change the fact that the contracts were still, 
                                                          
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally Reserve Clause, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-
reference.com/bullpen/reserve_clause (last updated Nov. 30, 2012). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1074, 1075 (1933), aff’d 72 F.2d 883 (1934). 
 114. Reserve Clause, supra note 110. 
 115. See Dallas Athletic Assn. v. Comm’r, 8 B.T.A. 1036 (1927) (“Each contract covered only the 
playing season the year in which or for which it was made, but was according to its terms renewable by 
the club or its assignee for the succeeding year. By virtue of the renewal provisions, the rights acquired 
under each contract extended beyond the year when the contracts were acquired.”); see Houston Base-
ball Assn. v. Comm’r, 24 B.T.A. 69 (1931). 
 116. Stephen R. Keeney, The Roster Depreciation Allowance: How Major League Baseball Teams 
Turn Profits into Losses, SOC’Y FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL RES. (2016), 
https://sabr.org/research/roster-depreciation-allowance-how-major-league-baseball-teams-turn-profits-
losses. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Peterson, supra note 107, at 12. 
 119. See Chicago Nat’l League Ball Club v. Comm’r; 33,197 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 239, 240 (1933), aff’d 
74 F.2d 1010 (1935); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1074, 1078 (1933), aff’d 72 F.2d 
883 (1934). 
 120. Peterson, supra note 107, at 12. 
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technically speaking, simply one-year agreements.121 The Board rejected the Ser-
vice’s suggestion that player contracts had an indefinite life.122 However, the Ser-
vice’s logic in the cases provided an opening for a future team owner to make 
another run at depreciating player contracts.123 
In 1946, baseball legend Bill Veeck purchased the Cleveland Indians.124 
Known throughout baseball for his creative approach to the sport, both on and off 
the field,125 Veeck made an interesting argument to the Service. He claimed that 
when a baseball team was purchased, the amount of the purchase price spent on 
acquiring player contract rights should be depreciable.126 His logic was easy to 
follow: when purchasing a sports team, an owner is buying relatively few tangible 
things.127 Outside of some equipment, an owner is mainly purchasing the goodwill 
of the sports team and rights to player contracts, among other intangibles, such as 
stadium leasing and merchandise rights.128 However, at the time of Veeck’s pur-
chase, most intangible assets were not depreciable.129 For an asset to be deprecia-
ble, it must decline in value at a readily determinable amount over a period of time 
that could be reasonably estimated—a set of criteria that only applied to tangible 
goods.130 
However, in a remarkable show of ingenuity, Veeck attempted to use the Ser-
vice’s logic against it to solve his problem. According to the ruling in Pittsburgh, 
player contracts, though intangible, were subject to amortization.131 While intan-
gible assets were not depreciable due to the lack of a readily-ascertainable useful 
life, the ruling that Veeck pointed to clearly allowed contracts to receive this 
treatment.132 Further, because there was no mechanism in the tax code by which to 
value these intangibles, the Service had to rely on the owner’s assessment of the 
collective contracts’ value as part of the overall purchase price.133 This created an 
incentive for franchise buyers to assign a large amount of the franchise purchase 
price to player contracts in order to take advantage of the depreciation allow-
ance.134 
                                                          
 121. See Pittsburgh, 27 B.T.A. at 1078 (“The contracts here involved were only for one year, with the 
option of renewal. If renewed, there is another contract.”); Peterson, supra note 107, at 12. 
 122. Keeney, supra note 116. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Warren Corbett, Bill Veeck, SOC’Y FOR AMERICAN BASEBALL RES., 
https://sabr.org/bioproj/person/7b0b5f10 (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 125. Veeck was known for his creative accounting practices (using debentures to fund his purchase of 
the Cleveland Indians), over-the-top promotional events (making on-the-field game decisions by hav-
ing audience members hold up numbered placards, hiring 3’7” pinch hitter Eddie Gaedel for one game 
to make a single plate appearance with the St. Louis Browns, hiring the “Clown Prince of Baseball” 
Max Patkin as a coach), and forward-thinking approach to the ongoing racial divide in baseball (sign-
ing black center fielder Larry Doby, the second black player in Major League Baseball, to play for his 
Cleveland Indians; when, during pregame festivities, Doby was shunned by three of his teammates, 
Veeck immediately fired them). See id. 
 126. Keeney, supra note 116. 
 127. A History of Tax Sheltering for Sports Team Ownership, HEAT HOOPS (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://heathoops.com/2014/11/a-history-of-tax-sheltering-for-sports-team-ownership/. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1074, 1078 (1933), aff’d 72 F.2d 883 (1934); 
Peterson, supra note 107, at 13. 
 132. Peterson, supra note 107, at 13. 
 133. A History of Tax Sheltering for Sports Team Ownership, supra note 127. 
 134. Keeney, supra note 116. 
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Similarly, in 1965, the newly-created Atlanta Falcons NFL team found itself 
in court after trying to depreciate the contracts of the players it had acquired in a 
recent expansion draft using Veeck’s method.135 The Service, in asserting a defi-
ciency, said the owners had assigned too much of the purchase price of the fran-
chise to player contracts.136 The Service also argued that the mass asset rule—a 
rule which essentially prevents the depreciation of intangibles with indeterminate 
life if they are inseparable from intangibles with a determinable life—should ap-
ply because it would be impossible to separate the cost of the franchise from the 
cost to acquire players.137 
The court disagreed with the Service yet again.138 It held that the mass asset 
rule did not apply because the contracts both had a separate value, easily discerni-
ble from the franchise, and a limited, useful life that could be reasonably ascer-
tained.139 
As a natural progression of Veeck’s logic concerning the cost of player con-
tracts and their allocation, future MLB commissioner Bud Selig purchased the 
Seattle Pilots baseball team in 1970.140 Out of the $10.8 million purchase price, 
Selig allocated an eye-popping $10.2 million to player contracts, representing 
about 94% of the total purchase price.141 Perhaps even more interesting, however, 
was that the contract obligations themselves totaled only $607,400.142 Selig amor-
tized the player contracts cost over their five-year useful lives, in accordance with 
Code § 167(a).143 In 1979, the Service disallowed the allocation, arguing instead 
that the contracts were effectively worth nothing, and adjusted Selig’s tax liability 
in line with that reasoning for 1967, 1968, and 1970 through 1976.144 
In the ensuing case, the district court found in favor of Selig’s allocation.145 In 
its holding, the court found that Selig’s valuation method was not inherently 
faulty.146 Further, and perhaps more importantly, the court found that player con-
tracts were the “primary assets” of the sports team at issue, and as such, allocating 
such a large percentage to player contracts was not unreasonable.147 In effect, by 
allowing franchise owners the ability to depreciate player contracts years be-
fore,148 the court was condemning the Service to reckon with its decision for the 
foreseeable future. 
Before the Selig decision was handed down, but after the Service had begun 
butting heads with Bud Selig over his allocation, Congress had already set out to 
combat the natural consequence of the Service’s framework. That framework gave 
                                                          
 135. Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 136. Id. at 1227. 
 137. Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1232 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 138. Id. at 1233–35. 
 139. Id. at 1234–35. 
 140. Peterson, supra note 107, at 15. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 144. Id. After the Service issued deficiencies, Selig paid the deficiencies and subsequently applied for 
a refund, which was rejected. In light of Selig’s allocation but before the eponymous case settled the 
question, Congress acted to prevent similar allocations in the future. See I.R.C. § 1056 (2014). 
 145. Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524, 542 (E.D. Wis. 1983). 
 146. Id. at 543. 
 147. Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Laird v. U.S., 556 F.2d 1224, 
1237 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 148. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 1074, 1076 (1933), aff’d 72 F.2d 883 (1934). 
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franchise owners a fair amount of discretion to allocate the purchase price of a 
franchise themselves, and the unspoken incentive among savvy team owners to 
overstate their basis in player contracts for the tax-sheltering benefits.149 In Sep-
tember 1976, President Gerald Ford signed into law the Tax Reform Act.150 The 
law set the allocation percentage to player contracts at a 50% limit via a newly-
created § 1056.151 This provision, in conjunction with a prior regulation, created 
what became known as the “50/5” rule: upon the purchase of a sports franchise, a 
new owner may depreciate, at most, 50% of the purchase price of the team over 
five years.152 
The 50/5 rule was seen by some team owners as unfair, because it limited de-
preciation of intangible assets in a way that only applied to sports teams, while 
purchasers in other industries were largely permitted to allocate the purchase price 
of their assets as they saw fit.153 Nonetheless, many team owners took advantage 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976’s rebuttable presumption. They continually argued 
that the percentage of their team’s purchase price should be greater than 50%.154 
In 1993, the tax landscape shifted again. As part of the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1993,155 Congress enacted Code § 197, which mandated that all 
intangible assets acquired as part of a business could be amortized over a 15-year 
period.156 However, in what surely seemed to team owners to be brazen cruelty, 
only one industry was exempted from this 15-year rule: the sports industry.157 
From then on, sports owners began using creative logic to allocate more of 
their purchase price to intangible assets (in addition to the 50% for player con-
tracts, which they normally exhausted).158 For example, team owners began look-
ing to other intangible assets in their franchises to amortize, including media 
rights, stadium lease agreements, season ticket holder lists, and the like.159 The 
Service then dedicated significant resources towards combating this creative ac-
counting, even going so far as to insist that teams use Service-provided guidance 
on government standards of valuation instead of the arbitrary valuation of the 
owners themselves.160 
                                                          
 149. Keeney, supra note 116. 
 150. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
 151. Id. § 212 at 1545. (“PRESUMPTION AS TO AMOUNT ALLOCABLE TO PLAYER 
CONTRACTS. —In the case of any sale or exchange described in subsection (a), it shall be presumed 
that not more than 50 percent of the consideration is allocable to contracts for the services of athletes 
unless it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that a specified amount in excess of 50 per-
cent is properly allocable to such contracts. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall give rise to a 
presumption that an allocation of less than 50 percent of the consideration to contracts for the services 
of athletes is a proper allocation.”); Keeney, supra note 116. 
 152. Keeney, supra note 116. 
 153. A History of Tax Sheltering for Sports Team Ownership, supra note 127. 
 154. See Robert Holo & Jonathan Talansky, Taxing the Business of Sports, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 161, 
190–91 (2008). 
 155. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). 
 156. Id. § 13261 at 107. (“GENERAL RULE.—A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization deduc-
tion with respect to any amortizable section 197 intangible. The amount of such deduction shall be 
determined by amortizing the adjusted basis (for purposes of determining gain) of such intangible 
ratably over the 15–year period beginning with the month in which such intangible was acquired.”). 
 157. Id. at 535. (“(e) EXCEPTIONS.—For purposes of [section 197], the term ‘section 197 intangi-
ble’ shall not include any of the following: . . . A franchise to engage in professional football, basket-
ball, baseball, or other professional sport, and any item acquired in connection with such a franchise.”). 
 158. A History of Tax Sheltering for Sports Team Ownership, supra note 127. 
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 160. Id. 
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After nearly a decade of disputes between sports teams and the Service 
caused by § 197, team owners were finally handed a victory when Congress 
passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.161 The Act repealed § 1056 and 
allowed sports teams to join the rest of the business world in amortizing their in-
tangible assets over a 15-year period.162 
In addition to the clear benefits for sports team owners, this repeal also pro-
vided instant benefits for the Service as well. By allowing nearly all intangible 
assets to be amortized over 15 years, the enforcement costs to the Service fell to 
nearly zero.163 Further, the Service reasoned that extending the length of time 
required to take advantage of this full amortization would lead to less turnover 
between sports teams.164 As had been the practice up until then, when a team had 
exhausted its amortization after five years, it became commonplace to sell the 
franchise to someone new, who could then amortize the assets for another five 
years.165 As such, the Service concluded that this extension would “increase tax 
revenue by $382 million over [ten] years.”166 Though no studies have been done 
to show the accuracy of this assumption, team ownership among many sports now 
tends to exceed five years, lending credence to this theory.167 
Thus, after nearly a century of tumultuous battles between the Service and 
sports teams, there seems to be universally accepted harmony in allowing owners 
to amortize player contracts over 15 years at most.168 Indeed, this seems logical, as 
the average MLB player’s career lasts 5.6 years,169 and contracts rarely reach ten 
years in duration.170 However, up to this point court discussion dealt mostly with 
player contracts acquired by means of purchasing a franchise. In today’s game, a 
substantial number of player contracts are acquired by rookie contracts, free agent 
signings, player contract trades between teams, as well as a myriad of other meth-
ods.171 
In the context of exchanges between businesses, tax consequences for teams 
that were a party to these player trades were, in theory, largely shaped by the val-
ue of the departing contract as it compares to the player contract they are receiv-
                                                          
 161. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
 162. Id. § 886 at 1641. (“(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 197(e) (relating to exceptions to definition of 
section 197 intangible) is amended by striking [the section concerning the exclusion of professional 
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 163. A History of Tax Sheltering for Sports Team Ownership, supra note 127. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for 
H.R. 4520, The “American Jobs Creation Act of 2004”, Fiscal Years 2005–2014 (Oct. 7, 2004); see 
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 167. A History of Tax Sheltering for Sports Team Ownership, supra note 127. 
 168. Peterson, supra note 107. 
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 171. Drew Balen, How Do MLB Clubs Acquire Players?, CALL TO THE PEN (Feb. 26, 2012), 
https://calltothepen.com/2012/02/26/how-do-mlb-clubs-acquire-players/. 
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ing.172 Further, because some teams may receive players that are more valuable 
than the players they gave up, the concept of taxable gain arises.173 
The Service has historically viewed a player trade as an exchange of con-
tracts, not people, and has allowed them to be treated as like-kind exchanges.174 
As a result, two trading teams were not required to recognize any gains or losses 
incurred (with the exception of boot).175 Because the like-kind exchange provision 
eliminates what might otherwise be a significant recognized gain for tax purposes, 
little else stood in the way of professional sports teams trading player contracts. If 
an exchange resulted in a substantial gain to a given team, the team could just roll 
that gain over “into the cost basis value of the new property,” deferring taxes into 
later years, which could theoretically go on indefinitely.176 If the trade involved 
cash as well (as some trades do), the cash received would not be covered by the 
nonrecognition clause and would be taxed at the time of the exchange.177 Another 
type of transaction, the trade for a player-to-be-named-later,178 was allowed so 
long as the receiving team identified the player in question within a given time 
frame.179 
Thus, before 2018, the development of taxation policy concerning the tax 
treatment of player contract trades led to a favorable environment for teams. From 
the ability to depreciate player contracts to the application of the like-kind ex-
change provisions, courts, Congress, and the Service fairly consistently treated 
such transactions quite favorably for tax purposes.180 Accordingly, teams across 
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all sports transacted with one another with abandon, a freedom that would soon 
become severely restricted by the enactment of the TCJA.181 
III. THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017 
On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act,182 which had been introduced in the House of Representatives less than 
two months prior. The law was quickly recognized by tax analysts as significantly 
beneficial to businesses in a variety of ways, not least being a reduction of the 
corporate tax rate.183 According to Congress and the President, the purpose of this 
lowered corporate tax rate was to allow American businesses to be more competi-
tive globally.184 Some analysts estimated that the reduction of tax rates would 
provide more incentives for investment.185 However, it is also estimated that these 
positive effects would be modest, and would only offset a portion of the loss of 
significant tax revenue expected to come from the law.186 In turn, Congress made 
a number of other alterations to the Code in order to offset the revenue losses, 
including modifying the net-operating loss deduction,187 limiting business interest 
deductions,188 and modifying the like-kind exchange provision,189 among many 
others.190 
Congress amended § 1031 of the Code by disallowing exchanges of any per-
sonal property to qualify for like-kind treatment.191 Nonrecognition treatment for 
like-kind exchanges now applies only to exchanges of real property to the exclu-
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sion of all other types of property, including sports player contracts.192 According 
to the Joint Committee on Taxation, this change alone was projected to raise at 
least $31 billion.193 
In all, the TCJA represented some of the most sweeping changes to the Code 
in decades.194 As is the case for a number of other businesses whose operations 
were upset by some ambiguities in the law,195 it is unclear whether Congress in-
tended to so drastically affect the trading of player contracts between professional 
baseball teams.196 In fact, considering Major League Baseball’s often favorable 
treatment by the legislative and judicial system,197 it is hard to imagine such a 
major effect on the sport was foreseen at all.198 However, § 1031 itself has often 
been part of tax reform proposals over the past decade.199 
In February of 2014, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee, Rep. David Camp, issued a draft of his “Tax Reform Act of 2014.”200 The 
document, which spanned nearly a thousand pages, included a repeal of § 1031.201 
Around two weeks later, President Obama released his budget proposals for 2015, 
in which most of the provisions matched Camp’s suggestions.202 However, while 
Camp aimed to eliminate § 1031 altogether, President Obama proposed a like-
kind deferral limit of $1 million per taxpayer annually, indexed for inflation.203 
His proposal also differed in that the limit was meant to apply only to like-kind 
exchanges of real property, ostensibly leaving personal property exchanges un-
touched for the time being.204 
While neither bill had much success in making it through a heavily-
gridlocked Congress, the subject of altering § 1031 was again raised in 2016, in 
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President Obama’s budget proposal for 2017.205 This time, the president’s sugges-
tion was similar to his last—a $1 million limitation on deferrals of gain realized 
via like-kind exchanges—albeit with one significant difference: this time, the 
limitation would apply to both real and personal property.206 Even more, the pro-
posal sought to exclude certain kinds of personal property from that definition, 
including some collectibles and art.207 The Treasury estimated that tax revenues 
would have been increased by more than $47 billion over ten years had the bill 
been accepted.208 
The TCJA took an opposite view of President Obama’s first proposal con-
cerning like-kind exchanges, namely in its limitation to real property only.209 Ac-
cording to the legislative history of the House proposal, the change was intended 
to continue the eligibility for real property that would otherwise already be eligi-
ble for tax deferral.210 After the Senate largely adopted the bill’s language on like-
kind exchanges without modification, President Trump signed the bill into law.211 
Some analysts suggested the change would create “traps for the unwary” aris-
ing from the TCJA’s temporary expensing provisions, timing issues, and ex-
changed personal property which will likely be considered “boot.”212 On the other 
hand, some opined that the TCJA’s change to § 1031 simplified the provision 
overall, as it rendered obsolete certain regulations and guidance that helped de-
termine how property of disparate product and asset classes would be treated.213 
Further, it was argued that two additional changes to the Code actually would 
result in more favorable treatment of dispositions of personal property, even those 
not of like-kind.214 First, the TCJA modified § 168(k) “to allow businesses to im-
mediately deduct 100% of” certain qualified property, rather than the 50% that 
was previously allowed, through what is known as “bonus depreciation.”215 The 
rule applies to both new and used property (another distinction from the previous 
bonus depreciation requirement, which only applied to new property), and is 
available through December 31, 2022.216 Second, the TCJA increased the maxi-
mum amount a taxpayer can immediately deduct under § 179 from $520,000 to $1 
million.217 This deduction is phased out if the amount of eligible property exceeds 
a certain amount (currently $2.5 million, an increase from $2.07 million).218 De-
spite these small provisions, which seem to help make up the difference for the § 
1031 change, there are still certain instances where personal property exchanges 
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do not qualify for bonus depreciation or § 179 expensing.219 Unfortunately, like-
kind exchanges and the resulting intangibles are among the types that do not qual-
ify.220 
IV. THE FUTURE OF PLAYER CONTRACTS IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
TCJA 
In general, when an MLB team signs a player to a new contract (distinct from 
a transaction where the team exchanges a contract with another team for a differ-
ent player or players), the salary is expensed by the team, while any signing bo-
nuses are capitalized and then depreciated if the contract term exceeds one year.221 
In this way, the cost of the player’s contract is depreciated over the life of the 
contract itself, not the average amount of time that the player himself will be in 
service for that team.222 Additionally, the signing bonus is eligible for bonus de-
preciation, which accelerates the write-off of certain depreciable assets.223 
Because of the TCJA’s decision to disallow like-kind exchanges of personal 
property, teams engaging in player trades will ostensibly be subject to immediate 
taxation in an amount equal to the difference between the fair market value of the 
player contract received and the adjusted basis of the player contract given up. 
Most, if not all the gain, will be ordinary gain because of the recapture provisions, 
which were not changed as a result of the TCJA.224 This change in the tax law can 
have a major impact on baseball trades in the future. Using rough numbers, it is 
estimated that the average baseball team has approximately $23.7 million of de-
ferred tax liability.225 This amount equals nearly 61% of a team’s operating reve-
nue for a single year.226 While some teams may assume they are freed from this 
liability by virtue of the statute of limitations on federal income tax filings, it is 
possible that the TCJA will cause the statute of limitations here to stretch from the 
trade date (or, rather, the like-kind exchange) to whenever that player retires or is 
traded to another team.227 However, the change made in the TCJA, which in-
creased the bonus depreciation allowance from 50% to 100%, could reduce the 
sting of this tax liability somewhat by allowing teams to deduct in full the costs of 
signing new players.228 
A. The Valuation Issue 
The largest issue with the TCJA’s effect on the player contract market is not 
necessarily the potential for tax liability. Rather, the single most pressing issue is 
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how to value player contracts to ensure compliance with the TCJA.229 For exam-
ple, in the trade involving Justin Verlander, the Houston Astros took on an obliga-
tion to pay him according to the terms of his contract with Detroit, which was 
approximately $28 million.230 In exchange, Detroit received four minor league 
players, each making minor league salaries (a negligible sum compared to those of 
major leaguers).231 The difference in salary obligations for each team may prove a 
useful means of determining the value of a player for purposes of calculating gain 
upon a trade. However, this is hardly the only solution. Some argue that baseball 
statistics could play a large role in valuing players for financial reasons, despite 
their initial use in assisting on-field management.232 For example, the statistic 
Wins Above Replacement (“WAR”) is often touted as a useful comprehensive 
statistic for valuing players.233 WAR’s meaning is somewhat intuitive from its 
context: by taking into account a large number of a player’s statistics, the value 
aims to represent just how valuable he is compared to his replacement.234 
Teams often use WAR to explain how many extra wins they might accrue 
over the course of a season with a given player on their roster.235 Moreover, teams 
will use a player’s WAR in conjunction with other factors, such as ticket revenue 
or merchandise sales, in order to assign him a dollar value.236 For example, the 
Astros were estimated to have two extra wins as a result of their acquisition of 
Verlander (for a post-acquisition WAR of 2.0), which they calculated as being 
worth approximately $20 million to their team.237 This was merely the team’s own 
assessment; others suggested that Verlander’s impact to the Astros was $10 mil-
lion more than the players they gave up in the exchange.238 However, because the 
TCJA had not yet been passed and the like-kind exchange provision still applied, 
the Astros experienced no taxable gain on the transaction; Verlander stayed with 
the team, allowing them to defer recognizing any gain until he is traded. Some 
even believe that contract value can be determined by calculating a player’s esti-
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mated future value to the team and subtracting the value of the players a team 
gives up in the exchange.239 
Despite all the valuation methods discussed, creating a mutually advanta-
geous strategy for valuing player contracts remains a difficult task.240 The greatest 
obstacle stems from the fact that there are only 30 teams in Major League Base-
ball, meaning the market is very small and the teams themselves have different 
needs. For example, a shortstop may be worth more to the St. Louis Cardinals 
than the Cincinnati Reds.241 Indeed, this is common in player contract trades, and 
the logic is easy to follow: a specific team finding that it has a surplus of talent at 
a given position will look for another team with a talent deficit at that same posi-
tion and offer a trade, hoping that the other team will value that player more than 
they do. Again, because the contracts have been depreciated or amortized, in most 
instances there will be gain to both teams because basis is reduced by depreciation 
and might even be at zero.242 
This valuation difficulty expands further when considering the other methods 
by which a team acquires future players, such as through the MLB Draft. In cer-
tain situations, a team may trade draft picks to other teams.243 Because there is a 
clear correlation between the talent levels of players drafted at higher positions, 
earlier draft picks would naturally have a higher value than lower ones.244 This 
would mean that teams trading those higher picks would likely recognize some 
gain. 
Though Major League Baseball requested guidance from the IRS on valuing 
player contracts, some experts suggested that the Service has more pressing is-
sues.245 Some predicted that the Service would view this the same as any other 
valuation issue, but because MLB saw the most player contract trades out of the 
four highest-profile sports leagues in the United States in 2017,246 many suggested 
that the issue could prove to be more significant than analysts think. 
B. Revenue Procedure 2019-18 
In April 2019, MLB got what it asked for: the IRS released official guidance 
on how to navigate the TCJA’s alterations to the like-kind exchange provision.247 
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In its analysis, the IRS acknowledged that correctly valuing baseball contracts is 
an attempt to hit a moving target.248 More specifically, the IRS noted that a num-
ber of factors contribute to that value fluctuating, such as player performance, 
team needs, player’s effect on ticket sales, and contract length.249 The IRS also 
pointed out the fact that a particular team’s valuation of the future value of a trad-
ed player is inherently subjective and varies from team to team due to differing 
needs.250 Ultimately, the Service came to the natural conclusion that all of these 
reasons make it particularly difficult to assign an objective value to player con-
tracts. 251 To remedy this difficulty and avoid “highly subjective, complex, 
lengthy, and expensive disputes” between the IRS and sports teams over these 
issues, a safe harbor provision was introduced that allowed the teams to value 
traded contracts as zero for gain and loss purposes under certain conditions.252 
In order for a team to use the safe harbor in a given trade, both teams must 
use it;253 they must also annotate the trade on their tax return in conformity with 
the guidance, but only if the team is subject to federal income tax in the U.S.254 
Further, the exchange must consist of only contracts, draft picks, or cash, and may 
not include § 197 intangibles.255 If the transaction involves no cash, then neither 
“party recognizes gain or loss on the trade,” and the basis in the contract received 
has a zero basis;256 if cash is part of the deal, however, the team sending the cash 
has a basis in the contract equal to the amount of the cash.257 This safe harbor also 
does not apply to team-for-team trades—only to trades of contracts or draft 
picks.258 
The release of Revenue Procedure 2019-18 effectively turned back the clock 
and allowed sports teams to continue trading while experiencing the same conse-
quences as before the enactment of the TCJA.259 Though a number of other tax 
rules regarding sales and exchanges still apply,260 the IRS’s willingness to play 
ball seems to have largely averted the crisis. However, time will tell whether the 
IRS guidance will be enough to provide a long-term solution to the issue, especial-
ly due to the constantly changing nature of the Code. Indeed, the guidance does 
only apply to a portion of potential trade scenarios for teams (though it does ad-
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dress a majority of them).261 Although, it is curious that the Department of the 
Treasury was the party that acted to address this issue. 
Though Treasury certainly had the authority to act, action on the part of Con-
gress would have been a more resounding solution to the issue. This also would 
not have been out of character, given the broad support given to professional 
sports teams (most of all baseball) by Congress in the past, as well as—in the eyes 
of some—”a solid legal basis for treating such trades as nontaxable” events.262 
V. THE ROAD FORWARD: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING 
PLAYER CONTRACT TRADE ISSUES 
In addition to the recent guidance, another possible solution to the issue is a 
new Code provision that maintains the taxability of player contract trades while 
affording teams significant authority to establish acceptable parameters for how to 
value player contracts. This system would likely hinge on all 30 teams coming to 
a mutually agreed-upon system for valuing players. However, because of issues 
with valuation,263 such a system is well beyond the scope of this article. If this 
solution is also chosen, it might be in the best interests of the Service to provide 
guidance to the teams as well.264 
A much more reasonable alternative would be for Congress to create a “carve 
out” in the Code which would specifically include professional sports player con-
tracts in the category of properties which should receive like-kind treatment. Some 
sample language is provided: 
26 U.S. Code § 1031. Exchange of real property held for productive 
use or investment 
(a) NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS FROM EXCHANGES SOLELY IN 
KIND 
(1) In general. No gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of 
real property held for productive use in a trade or business or for invest-
ment if such real property is exchanged solely for real property of like 
kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or 
for investment. 
… 
(4) Exception for Sports Player Contracts. For purposes of this section, 
“real property” shall include sports player contracts. 
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Applying such a provision to the Code would avert a substantial hardship to 
professional sports teams while allowing the Service to realize a significant addi-
tion to revenue, which likely was the goal of the amendment in the first place. 
Additionally, affording player contracts the treatment that they would receive in 
this example would likely shield these events from similar hiccups that may arise 
in future amendments to the Code. This is all the more appealing given the rela-
tively negligible amount of revenue that might be lost through this exemption,265 
compared to the potentially detrimental effect the law might otherwise have on 
professional sports teams. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite an extremely polarized political climate, the TCJA has found a signif-
icant number of supporters due to its favorable treatment of corporations. Howev-
er, inherent in this favorable treatment is the necessity for Congress to take base-
broadening measures to make up for lost tax revenue. As such, it seems unlikely 
that the TCJA would be repealed to any significant degree, relevant to this subject. 
But the game of baseball has been considered America’s pastime since its incep-
tion in the 19th century. Since that time, the focus of the game has spread from the 
athletic feats on the field to the personnel decisions made in the front office. The 
trading of players is an intrinsic feature of the sport, and factors as much into a 
team’s success as their actual performance on the diamond. If the TCJA is to be 
applied literally to professional sports teams, especially without proper guidance, 
there is a chance that baseball could change for the worse. In order to preserve the 
balance between all facets of the game, Congress should address how a seemingly 
insignificant oversight has created an untenable scenario on the baseball diamond, 
and proactively reverse its course by implementing an exception to the Code 
which would allow professional sports teams to freely participate in player trades 
without recognizing gain. To do otherwise would be to sacrifice too much in order 
to gain too little. Given the prominence of baseball on American culture, this is a 
sacrifice that should be avoided at all costs. 
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